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AMER ICAN POL I T I CAL THOUGHT AND AMER ICAN POL IT ICAL
DEVELOPMENT
Political Thought, Political
Development, and America’s
Two Foundings
ELV IN L IM
ABSTRACT
The relationship between American political thought (APT) and American political
development (APD) as phenomena as well as subﬁelds in American Politics has not
been sufﬁciently theorized. This essay takes up what I call the Second Founding of
1787–89 as the critical case for examining the close relationship between APT and
APD. The statesmen of that era were thinkers and developmentalists of the ﬁrst order;
they understood the inseparable link between political justiﬁcation and political
change. This dynamic relationship between American political thought and develop-
ment practiced in 1787–89 can be used as a blueprint for understanding the entwined
cycles of political justiﬁcation and change in American politics.
The most signiﬁcant developmental episode of American politics, what I call
the Second Founding of 1787–89, which culminated in the abolition of the
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union and the ratiﬁcation of a new
Constitution, was also the most productive moment for American political
thought (APT). The Second Founding generated a substantial body of liter-
ature that would later enter into the canon of APT, chief among these were
the Federalist Papers, as well as Anti-Federalist writings such as the Letters
from the Federal Farmer. The ideas articulated in this literature would, af-
ter much negotiation, turn into tangible institutions. The Federalists were
therefore not only our ﬁrst political thinkers under the present Constitution;
they were also the ﬁrst developmentalists. The framers, mostly Federalists,
defended a set of principles to bring about the biggest “durable shift in
governing authority” in American politics—a new constitution (Orren and
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Skowronek 2004, 103). From the beginning, APT and APD (American po-
litical development) were integrally linked.
THE TWO FOUNDINGS AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT
APT has its foundations in two indigenous strands of political thought that
come from what I call the Two Foundings (Lim 2014). For the United States
has had Two Foundings, not one, and the Anti-Federalists pushed back so
indignantly against the Federalists’ proposal in 1787–88 only because of their
ﬁdelity to the First Founding. The First Founding started in 1776, when the
13 colonies declared themselves “Free and Independent States” and came
together, with their sovereignties fully intact, to adopt and ratify the Articles
of Confederation in 1777 and 1781. In 1787–89, the Anti-Federalists, de-
fenders of the principles of the First Founding, were particularly partial to
this older view of union and the political thought associated with it. They
combined a radical Whig, classical republican, “Country” philosophy to de-
fend their idea of the small republic and added to that an adapted Lockean
liberalism that undergirded their opposition to the proposed federal govern-
ment. The Second Founding transpired in 1787–89, after the failed experiment
of the Articles, when each of the 13 states yielded a portion of its individual
sovereignty to create a new compound republic, still partly federal but now
also national, with a federal government sanctioned by “We the People” ag-
gregated across state lines. The Federalists—our Second Founders—promul-
gated this new version of federalism and union and the new republicanism
associated with it. The Second Founding radically reconﬁgured the older con-
ception of union as merely a compact between 13 sovereign states, creating “a
more perfect Union” by way of a nationalized “We the People.” Critically,
alongside these new ideas was also a paradigmatically APD we will explore
further below: the Second Founding created a nation out of what was once
merely a league of states.
The Anti-Federalists and Federalists differed sharply and conﬁdently from
one another also because each could point to a sacred text of the First and
Second Foundings, in the Declaration of Independence (once the Articles of
Confederation had fallen into relative disrepute) and the Constitution, re-
spectively, to ground its claims about the meaning of the American experi-
ment. These texts represent not only the old and new federalisms, respectively;
they also instantiate antithetical orientations toward power. Whereas the
Declaration (and the Bill of Rights, which is in important ways the Declara-
tion reincarnated) articulates our rights against government, the Constitution
enumerates the powers of government. Consistent with this distinction is a
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conspicuous insistence in Anti-Federalist political thought that the American
political tradition began not in 1789—the year a more consolidated govern-
ment than ever envisioned by the revolutionaries was created—but in 1776,
the year when the original central government, monarchy itself, was over-
thrown. The Anti-Federalists believed themselves to be the true inheritors
of the Spirit of ’76, a spirit committed to breaking bonds, not building new
ones; disestablishment, not consolidation. The Anti-Federalists believed that
America’s Revolutionary ideals stand in chronological and moral priority to
the Second Founding’s (Federalist) principles.
The Preamble of the Constitution, by sharp contrast to the principles of the
First Founding, is a strident statement of optimism about the value of gov-
ernment, as well as the collective goals that government can accomplish for us
that we cannot do for ourselves, which is to “establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” The Anti-
Federalists rejected these collective aspirations of We the People, recalling the
Articles of Confederation’s reference to “United States in Congress assem-
bled” and arguing that there are only the peoples of each state. Whereas the
Anti-Federalists, “men of little faith,” had only known consolidated govern-
ment, namely, monarchy, as a thing to be feared, the Federalists put their faith
in institutions and in the possibility that the people could rule and yet be ruled
(Kenyon 1955).
The Anti-Federalists defended the First Founding because they thought
that republicanism and in particular self-government could ﬂourish only in
small republics. They believed, on the one hand, that pure or direct democ-
racy—to which they were more partial than were the Federalists—was more
likely to ﬂourish in a small republic and that representation would be more
accurate if there was a low ratio of the number of representatives to the num-
ber of citizens represented. On the other hand, they believed that a large re-
public would not only render pure democracy impracticable; it would further
require a convoluted and ultimately ineffectual scheme of representation. This,
in turn, stemmed from the Anti-Federalist theory of representation, which
posited that effective and accountable representation could only occur when
there is a close or a mirror resemblance between the representative and the rep-
resented (De Maio and Muzzio 1991). As Melancton Smith had argued, rep-
resentatives ought to be “a true picture of the people, possess a knowledge of
their circumstances and their wants, sympathize in all their distresses, and be
disposed to seek their true interests.”1 This was only possible in the context of
small, relatively homogenous republics.
1. Speech of Melancton Smith, New York Ratiﬁcation Convention, June 21, 1788
(Storing 1981, 6:157).
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If the Anti-Federalists were not conﬁdent that effective representation could
operate in a large republic, the Federalists were not convinced that small re-
publics encouraged virtuous representation, because of the potential, osten-
sibly, for small spaces to breed faction. Instead, the Federalists placed their
faith in institutions that privileged a trusteeship, rather than a mirroring model
of representation, whereby the will of the people could be distilled from the
defects of democracy. As Gordon Wood observed, the Second Founders were
pragmatists who adopted “a more modern and more realistic sense of political
behavior” (Wood 1969, 606). They did not think that men in small republics
would always treat one another like friends and neighbors. One may even say
that the Anti-Federalists, like George Mason, were principled, even utopian,
philosophers; while the Federalists, like John Adams, were pragmatic political
scientists. The former envisioned many small and virtuous republics, while
the latter wanted a stronger union and were willing to revise classical repub-
licanism to that end.
THE TWO FOUNDINGS AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
The developmental outcome of the Second Founding, the Constitution, bears
the imprint of the two indigenous strands of APT defended, respectively, by
the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. The Second Founding institutionally
layered one conception of democratic sovereignty onto another that had been
codiﬁed 7 years before, leaving the United States with two legitimate but
antithetical conceptions of union and federalism.
To understand how the Constitution came to possess its bifurcated na-
ture, we must appreciate the contrasting interpretations of America’s initial
experience with self-government in the 1780s. Scholars who have studied the
“founding”—almost all monolithically—have reached back to before 1776
(Bailyn 1992; Rahe 1992), placed the late 1780s in the same celebrated era
as 1776 (Jensen 1940; Schmitt andWebking 1979), or characterized the 1780s
as the disaster, most graphically represented by Shays’s Rebellion, from which
we were permanently rescued in 1787 (Farrand 1908; Thach 1922). None
explored the implications of two distinct foundings, and only the second
group took the important ﬁrst step of chronicling the successes of 1781–89,
where democracy and self-government breathed its ﬁrst breath here under the
Articles of Confederation, arguably the ﬁrst democratically debated and en-
acted constitution in the world. This period must be taken seriously, for it
is because the Articles of Confederation had enjoyed enough successes that
Anti-Federalist attachment to it proved so resilient. Between 1776 and 1789
were the critical years 1781–89, when public enemy number 1, the British, was
gone, and Americans got used to one conception of federalism that they had
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democratically enacted—unanimously—and one that promised “Perpetual
Union,” no less.
Rightly or wrongly, those who refused to sign on to the Second Founding
saw this period as the age of original American innocence, when a constel-
lation of 13 sovereign and virtuous republics enjoyed and jealously guarded
their hard-won liberties formalized under the Articles of Confederation. On
the eve of the American Revolution, well ahead of the ratiﬁcation of the
second Constitution, state sovereignty was born when provincial congresses
from 10 of the original 13 colonies drew up and democratically ratiﬁed their
state constitutions.2 Ten states drew up new constitutions within a year of
declaring independence. Massachusetts waited until 1780 because the ﬁrst
version of its constitution, promulgated by the General Court, was rejected
by the citizens, who objected that they had not been consulted on its contents.
By 1777, only Rhode Island and Connecticut were still operating under royal
charters (with references to the monarchy struck out) and not by a state
constitution ratiﬁed by the people of the state (Adams 2001, 3).3 “The unan-
imous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America” was the ﬁrst col-
lective expression of fellow feeling among the colonists, although it was one
united mostly by commitments to negative liberty and state sovereignty, as
registered by the capitalization of “States” but not the “united.” The memory
of the First Founding would bear heavily on Anti-Federalist minds in 1787–
89. Indeed, their successful insistence on a Bill of Rights as a condition for
ratiﬁcation meant that the Second Founding never fully displaced the First.
2. This was, to be sure, an outgrowth of the tradition of constitutionalism that the
colonists inherited from Britain. Since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, British subjects in the
United States had developed a distinct sense of their rights as Englishmen, who had over-
thrown the already limited British monarchy and replaced it with a constitutional monarchy,
unlike the French who had yet to overthrow absolutism (Arendt 1963, 154).
3. These exceptions actually prove the rule. Connecticut’s and Rhode Island’s charters
may be construed as their ﬁrst state constitutions because they were secured by local leaders
and represented the most liberal charters secured from the Crown among the colonies,
guaranteeing fundamental freedoms and self-government. Both colonies, for example, were
the only ones that did not have royal governors and judges installed. Connecticut’s Funda-
mental Orders of 1638–39 was the ﬁrst document written by a representative body in North
America setting up a framework for government—it was the ﬁrst American constitution.
Rhode Island, similarly, likely enjoyed the greatest degree of independence from the Crown.
Its Charter of 1663 was the ﬁrst among the colonies to be guaranteed that “all and every
person and persons may, from time to time, and at all times hereafter, freely and fully have
and enjoy his and their own judgments and consciences, in matters of religious concern-
ments” (see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ri04.asp). As Rhode Island was the ﬁrst to
declare independence (on May 4, 1776) from the British Crown, jealous as it was of its liber-
ties, so it was the last to ratify the Constitution (on May 29, 1790) among the 13 colonies.
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The First Founding’s conception of democratic sovereignty and collective
identity was embodied in the Articles of Confederation, which was styled a
“league of friendship” (in Art. 3) between the states. Crucially, this consti-
tution codiﬁed not only a much looser relationship between the states than the
second Constitution, but it also boasted a democratic pedigree to rival the one
that replaced it. The Second Founders, therefore, were not operating on a clean
slate. This, then, is about as close as one can come to staking an empirically
veriﬁable claim about American exceptionalism: the United States is the only
federal country in the world to have democratically enacted two and only
two constitutions. This fundamental fact deﬁnes the “A” in APD and APT.
Americans began their world again twice. Separatist movements in other fed-
eral republics tend to be piecemeal conﬂicts that call only for secession of par-
ticular territories, not alternative conceptions of union applicable to all terri-
tories. Elsewhere, language or culture is a basis of local identity while national
identity is democratically constructed. In the United States, state and national
identities are a matter of democratic construction, entwined in two distinct con-
ceptions of union articulated at Two Foundings.
To be sure, Publius, in Federalist 15–22, would come to attack the ﬁrst
Constitution’s “insufﬁciency.” The choice of words is telling in that no one
ever dared to challenge its legitimacy, but many did challenge the democratic
legitimacy of the Philadelphia convention and its product. Insufﬁcient or not,
the Articles and the Confederated Congress that formally operated from 1781
to 1789 were democratically ordained. It was also under the auspices of the
Confederation Congress that the American Revolution was conducted and
concluded with the Treaty of Paris. Indeed, one could plausibly argue that the
Articles was a more contemporaneous expression and institutionalization of
the Revolution’s ideals. The Articles was drafted by a committee of the Second
Continental Congress in June 1776 and debated for over a year, more than the
4 months delegates spent at the Philadelphia convention. It was then sent off
to the state legislatures for ratiﬁcation and became ofﬁcial in 1781 with the
unanimity required for ratifying it. Compare the painstaking 4 years it took to
ratify the ﬁrst constitution and the blitzkrieg strategy occurring over 9 months
to ratify the second. Before the ratiﬁcation of the Bill of Rights in 1791, there
had already been 17 state constitutional conventions in 11 states.4 We the
People of the States had spoken many times beforeWe the People of the United
4. Three states held multiple conventions before the ratiﬁcation of the Bill of Rights:
Georgia (1776–77, 1788, 1789×2), New Hampshire (1776, 1778–79, 1781–83), and Penn-
sylvania (1776, 1789–90). And three states held their ﬁrst state constitutional conventions
after: Connecticut (1818), New Jersey (1844), and South Carolina (1790; see Dinan 2006,
8–9).
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States did. This was the crux of the legitimating puzzle that Publius faced. It is
because the Anti-Federalists’ conception of confederal or peripheralized fed-
eralism had enjoyed over a decade of practice and reinscription in the minds
of Americans that Madison understood that he had to justify (and possibly to
disguise) his new, centralized federalism to the Anti-Federalists in the form of
a “compound” republic.
The Anti-Federalists were up in arms not because they were against the
federal idea but because they believed that Americans had already spoken
loudly in favor of one conception of it. It was thus with incredulity that Cin-
cinnatus posed the question, “will any one believe, that it is because we are
become wiser, that in twelve years we are to overthrow every system which
reason and experience taught us was right?”5 The Articles of Confederation
had codiﬁed a completely different orientation toward power and (states’)
rights than the Constitution. Whereas most (80%) of the words in the Con-
stitution were dedicated to describing the powers of government in its ﬁrst
three articles (as opposed to the rights of the governed, which do not enjoy the
advantage of chronological placement), the Articles of Confederation was
much more circumspect about power, spending only about half of that pro-
portion describing the powers of Congress and only late in the text, in Arti-
cle 9. The government created under the Articles had no executive, no judi-
ciary, and no taxing power. Indeed, the united States (sic) in 1787 were
arguably not a nation with a coherent identity but entered into existence only
as the delegates of the states were “in Congress assembled.”6 Some Anti-
Federalists, such as William Symmes, were so committed to state sovereignty
that they even rejected the “republican guarantee clause” (Art. 4, Sec. IV) of
the Constitution. This is just about the purest afﬁrmation of the First Found-
ing’s old federalism as there could have been.
For a new Constitution to replace a preexisting one, the Federalists knew
that they had to launch a ratiﬁcation campaign that could conjure as much
democratic sanction for their Constitution as the old one possessed. It would
be “the ﬁrst national campaign in a popularly based, territorially extended,
representative government” (Riker 1996, 24). This was a campaign that both
sanctioned and attenuated the legitimacy of the states in its ratiﬁcation rule
speciﬁed in Article 7. And here, the tangible and dynamic link between in-
stitutions and ideas, APD and APT, is manifest. On the one hand, Article 7
simply assumed that the states, created at the First Founding, were legitimate
5. Cincinnatus IV, 11/22/1787 (Storing 1981, 6:20).
6. As Article 2 of the Articles of Confederation stated, “Each state retains its sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”
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units of the union, of which the concurrence of nine was necessary for rati-
fying the Constitution. On the other hand, Article 7 explicitly forbade the state
legislatures, where state sovereignties were formally vested, from having a
voice in the ratiﬁcation process. Instead, it was determined that “Conventions
of nine states” would be sufﬁcient for ratiﬁcation. Thus, in Article 7 alone we
may observe how the democratic legitimacy of the Second Founding’s new
federalism was strategically constructed or creatively synthesized with the old
federalism. In it, the Federalists reconﬁgured the body politic, creating an
aggregated We the People when no such entity existed before, while legiti-
mating (and simultaneously disguising) the creation by partially afﬁrming the
prior legitimacy of the states. And thus even before ratiﬁcation was secured,
the very rule speciﬁed for ratiﬁcation had already secured “a more perfect
Union”—in effect, a different kind of union. The Federalists also secured the
legitimacy of the new federalism by stipulating in Article 4, Section III, the
authority of the federal government to admit new states and to “make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States.”7 This meant that whereas the territorial
boundaries of the 13 original colonies were created by royal decree or charter,
the territorial boundary of the United States was not. The Federalists had laid
the groundwork for a “more perfect Union.”
If that had been that, perhaps the Federalists would have had the ﬁnal
word, and the United States would not have had to endure a recurring lovers’
quarrel about the meaning of the union. But the Articles’ conception of peri-
pheralized federalism would make a comeback in the Bill of Rights, layered
on the centralized federalism envisaged by the Federalists. It is very signiﬁcant
that Publius in Federalist 84 had argued eloquently against a Bill, suggesting
(among other reasons) that a government truly constituted by the people
would not need enumerated restraints. But the Anti-Federalists would not
back down precisely because they differed on the method of constructing “the
People”—they saw only the People of the States. All told, We the People spoke
twice—in 1776–81 and 1787–89—not once. The Second Founding did not
settle the debate of American identity; it opened it. This is whyAPD can only be
“durable” but never permanent, because we have never conclusively settled
the question of just who we are. Madison acknowledged as much in Federal-
7. This was an afﬁrmation of the principles of the Northwest Ordinance of July 1787,
which stripped all existing states’ claims to the territory; provided government under the
jurisdiction of Congress for the area north of the Great Lakes, west of the Ohio River, and
east of the Mississippi River; secured a guarantee of the rights of the inhabitants; and paved
the way for the westward expansion of the United States by the inclusion of new states
rather than the expansion of the existing states (Onuf 1987).
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ist 46, when he said that the “federal and State governments are in fact but
different agents and trustees of the people.” Similarly, he tried to smooth over
divisions between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists by observing in
Federalist 39 that the Constitution is “partly federal and partly national.”
This was what developmentalists would term “intercurrence” of the ﬁrst or-
der, the layering of the artifacts of one era over another that laid the ground-
work for future quarrel (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 113).
The intercurrence of two conceptions of federalism and union, present in
the provision for ratiﬁcation, is even more evident in the provision for amend-
ment, the place in the Constitution that both constrains and permits change.
Bruce Ackerman was right that Article 5 is where the heart of the Constitution
lies, but contrary to him, its heart is not dualism but rather the new federalism
(Ackerman1991). BecauseArticle5 iswhere thepolity’s developmentalpotential
is laid out, it is also the place where the polity’s most fundamental understand-
ing of its identity is articulated. Article 5 stipulates that any amendment to the
Constitution must ﬁrst be proposed by two-thirds of Congress or two-thirds
of the state legislatures to call a national convention and then ratiﬁed by three-
quarters of the state legislatures or state ratifying conventions, with the method
of ratiﬁcation to be decided byCongress. Two features of the higher-lawmaking
method are worthy of note. First, the ratiﬁcation is always left to the states. In
this, the preexisting legitimacy and sovereignty of the states is recognized, an
acknowledgment of the order of things codiﬁed in 1781. Second and conversely,
while the ratiﬁcation is always left to the states, it is the federal Congress that
always plays an agenda-setting part in deciding whether the ratifying units
would be state legislatures or conventions. Further, once a supermajority is
reached, the new amendment is binding even on those states that did not con-
sent to the amendment. To accept that a majority can speak for the whole is to
accept the linked fate that makes a nation. This is a sharp departure from the
unanimity required in the Articles. As such, the new ratiﬁcation rule repre-
sented a critical movement toward centralized federalism, and the result was the
layering of a new conception of federalism on the old. Article 5 ordained that
in order for there to be APD, the proponents of the First and Second Foundings
must wage a lovers’ quarrel about the foundational cleavage of APT and, in so
doing, reach a consensus about the nature and the institutional conﬁguration of
the union for each political generation.
CONCLUSION
Even though the Federalists won the day, scholars have estimated that the
balance of public opinion for and against ratiﬁcation was probably roughly
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equal.8 Of the 55 men who came to Philadelphia in 1787, 16 did not sign off
on the proposed Constitution that was sent for ratiﬁcation in the states. That
is to say, even after the agenda-setting of the Virginians, the intense lobbying
of Publius, and the procedural tricks of the Federalists such as the insistence
on the ratiﬁcation rule of all or nothing, a sizable number of “framers” re-
mained adamantly Anti-Federalist. For all of Publius’s considerable persuasive
skills, America’s ﬁrst understanding of democratic sovereignty took consid-
erable hold. And that is why even though the Articles came to be seriously
discredited, there were fundamental aspects of it that were transferred to the
Constitution, especially in Articles 5 and 7, and why 2 centuries after the fact,
there are still nationally prominent ﬁgures chanting its leitmotif.
APT, in its focus on ideas, and APD, with its focus on institutions, exam-
ine American politics from either end of the dynamic interaction between
ideas and how they become institutions. Both share the “A” not simply be-
cause they occupy the same geographical site but because they operate un-
der the lengthened shadow of America’s unique lovers’ quarrel. At the birth of
our present Constitution, the statesmen who gathered at Philadelphia were
thinkers and developmentalists both, interrogating and negotiating thought
and development in high gear. They produced a set of governing institutions
that synthesized the principles of our Two Foundings. They constitutionalized
the inseparable relationship between APT and APD.
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